Deep geological disposal is one of the most ambitious and most difficult tasks on earth.

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NUCLEAR WASTE REPORT 2019

Focus Europe.

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Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz

Lüchow-Dannenberg

This report would have not been possible without the generous support of a diverse group of friends and partners, in particular – listed in alphabetical order – the Altner-Combecher Stiftung, Bäuerliche Notgemeinschaft Trebel, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz (BUND), Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg e.V., Climate Core and Green/EFA MEPs Group in the European Parliament, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and its offices in Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Prague, and Washington DC, KLAR! Schweiz, Annette und Wolf Römmig, and the Swiss Energy Foundation. Thank you all for making this possible!

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More than 40 years ago in my home region, the forest near the village of Gorleben was chosen as the location for the German National Nuclear Waste Disposal Center. The site, which is now at the country’s center but at the time was located directly on the border between East and West Germany, was meant to host all facilities for reprocessing, treatment, storage, and a deep geological repository. The company responsible (which has long since closed) intended to open the repository for spent fuel in the salt dome named Gorleben-Rambow in 1999.

After Fukushima, the German government decided to phase out nuclear energy for the second time.

The experience of the nuclear catastrophe in Japan in 2011 also set in motion the review of the plans for the repository at Gorleben. After around 40 years of debating and fighting over Gorleben, the German government and parliament decided in favor of a new participatory site selection process for the repository for high-level nuclear waste. Looking back at the last 40 years and forward over the many decades until a repository might be available illustrates the difficulties for humankind to cope with the eternal legacies of nuclear energy. Considering the 40-year history of attempted disposal at Gorleben, and the many problems and challenges we now know about, it is unrealistic to expect the commissioning of a repository before the second half of this century.

Germany is not the only country in search of a suitable repository or facing difficult decisions about nuclear waste. For the last 15 years, as a member of the European Parliament, I followed the attempts at phasing out nuclear energy in and outside of the European Union. An important initiative came from Mycle Schneider, Paris, who suggested refuting the fairytale of a global nuclear renaissance. He and his team of authors release the yearly World Nuclear Industry Status Report, which proves that renewable energy is defeating nuclear power both because of tremendous risks of nuclear technology, and because of its high price. During the presentation of the status report in recent years, we had more and more questions about the absence of the nuclear waste issues, especially since these issues are also a factor for the costs of nuclear power. In the past years I also followed the European Commission’s efforts to establish a better overview and a common framework for decommissioning, nuclear waste management, disposal, and financial provisions.

The recurring questions and the disappointing outcome of the European Commission’s initiative moti- vated me to tackle this challenge with the idea of the WORLD NUCLEAR WASTE REPORT (WNWR).

In this first edition our team of European experts describes the technologies, strategies, preparatory processes, and financial provisions for disposal. We are convinced that information from national con- texts should be both better accessible and comparable. In spite of international conventions on nuclear waste, even categories for waste classification differ from country to country.

Deep geological disposal is one of the most ambitious and most difficult tasks on earth.

The specific risks of nuclear waste require a safe enclosure for one million years. In addition, disposal strategies promise the possibility of retrieval and recovery at least for a limited period. The carelessness and the hubris in the nuclear industry and in pro-nuclear governments around the risks of nuclear waste have created mistrust rather than confidence among citizens. We face a difficult task ahead: the search

FOREWORD

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for the best possible and most responsible solution. Addressing this task demands from society, politicians, citizens, science and industry to be more open and patient, money, and willing to admit mistakes and failures and to rethink approaches and strategies. This applies to all countries which have used nuclear energy or which are nuclear arms states.

This first edition of the WNWR covers a broad range of key issues on the topic and grew much longer than initially planned; yet it is obviously not fully comprehensive. Funding limits define its scope in part.

But it is also due to the fact that we did not have access to full data and qualified authors for all countries. We plan the WNWR as a periodical that should be regularly updated, expanding on new themes and covering more countries in the future. Future issues could include important and under-researched issues like bottlenecks of interim storage and the comparison of immediate dismantling versus safe confinement after the final shutdown of nuclear power plants. The latter question emerges when large nuclear power plants are decommissioned without available storage and disposal capacities, as is the case in Germany. In all countries the amount of nuclear waste is growing, the capacities for storage are limited, final disposal is not yet available and the costs for managing the waste are rising. Some governments respond to this challenge by weakening standards for the industry, for example lowering the levels for when waste from decommissioning must be classified as radioactive. This clearance of fractions of the waste by free measurement should be also an issue of the next volume.

Among our current group of authors, the majority favors deep geological disposal for high-level waste if it is tied to clear and ambitious conditions for the site selection, exploration, and approval processes.

There is a strong consensus that the current research and the scientific debate and exchange with politicians and involved citizens is severely insufficient. In spite of the support for deep geological disposal we are convinced that the debate on alternatives should not be avoided and that this issue deserves more attention, likely in the next volume. Currently there is no guarantee for the feasibility of the intended deep geological repositories. All in all, while the work on this first edition of the World Nuclear Waste Report is completed, I see many issues to be addressed in future volumes.

After working on nuclear waste issues and the German site selection process since 1975, I have to as- sume that it will take still several generations before a repository which is based on the best available solutions could be opened and operating. That is why I think it is our duty to pass to the next generation some experience and knowledge which we as critics of nuclear power have gained so far. It is the next generations which will bear the responsibility for finding a solution for nuclear waste, the eternal legacy of the short nuclear age. In the making of this report I see the cooperation of old and young as a valuable contribution to the generational change. A critical debate and reflection must be integrated part of the search for the best available and feasible solution for disposal of nuclear waste. The process must always be focused on solutions. We can phase out nuclear power, but we cannot phase out the nuclear waste and its eternal risks.

My thanks and appreciations go to all our authors, contributors and all those who supported us with work, knowledge, and funds.

Dickfeitzen, Wendland, not far from Gorleben in July 2019 REBECCA HARMS

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The WORLD NUCLEAR WASTE REPORT (WNWR) is a common project by a group of renowned experts who want to draw more attention to radioactive waste as a significant and growing challenge with no long-term solutions yet available. The project was initiated by Rebecca Harms, and the original outline was produced by Wolfgang Neumann, Mycle Schneider and Gordon MacKerron.

The core team of the WNWR project (Rebecca Harms, Mycle Schneider, Arne Jungjohann, and Anna Turmann) has been working since mid-2018 to win partners and raise funds for the project, to identify contributors, and to publish the report. Rebecca Harms took on the overall project lead. Arne Jungjohann served as the lead editor and project coordinator. Anna Turmann provided invaluable coordi- nation, organization, editing, and budget planning. Mycle Schneider and Gordon MacKerron contributed effective and thoughtful advice in shaping the project.

We are very grateful for the excellent work delivered by the contributors, a diverse group of international experts, who each drafted one or more chapters: Manon Besnard, Marcos Buser, Ian Fairlie, Gordon MacKerron, Allison Macfarlane, Eszter Matyas, Yves Marignac, Edvard Sequens, Johan Swahn, and Ben Wealer. A list of bios can be found in the back of the report.

The WNWR greatly benefitted from partial or comprehensive proofreading, edits and comments by Andrew Blowers, Craig Morris, Mycle Schneider, Marcos Buser, Gordon MacKerron, Johan Swahn, and Markku Lehtonen. Silvia Weko served as an invaluable help with precise proofreading, editing tables and footnotes, and developing the author styleguide.

We would like to thank the Berlin-based Agency for Renewable Energies and in particular Andra Kradolfer for developing the design and the successful implementation of graphs and tables.

The WNWR project’s website is www.worldnuclearwastereport.org and was designed by Arne Jungjohann. It includes more information and possible future updates.

The WNWR contains a very large amount of factual and numerical data. While we do our utmost to verify and double-check, nobody is perfect. The contributors and editors are grateful for corrections and suggested improvements (info@worldnuclearwastereport.org).

HOW TO CITE THIS REPORT:

The World Nuclear Waste Report. Focus Europe. 2019. Berlin & Brussels.

www.worldnuclearwastereport.org

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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KEY INSIGHTS

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COSTS AND FINANCES

• Governments do not apply the polluter-pays-principle consistently.

While operators are liable for the costs of managing, storing, and disposing of nuclear waste, costs may end up being borne by taxpayers.

• Governments fail to properly estimate the costs for decommissioning, storage, and disposal of nuclear waste due to underlying uncertainties. Many governments base their cost estimates on overly optimistic discount rates and outdated data, leading to serious funding gaps for waste management costs.

• Overall, no country has both estimated costs precisely and closed the gap between secured funds and cost estimates.

ORIGINS AND CLASSIFICATIONS

• Countries differ significantly in how they define and categorize nuclear waste and in how they report about generated amounts of nuclear waste. All countries publish regularly information, yet not all report in a thorough way.

• Despite international efforts to establish common safety principles and practices, such inconsistencies remain and make comparison very complex. The different

national approaches reflect a lack of coherency in how countries manage nuclear waste.

RISKS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH

• Nuclear waste constitutes a health hazard due to routine gaseous and liquid waste emissions from nuclear facilities and the global collective doses from reprocessing.

• Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel poses increased challenges,

including proliferation risks, high exposures to humans, and contamination of the environment.

• Overall, there is a lack of comprehensive, quantitative and qualitative information on risks associated with nuclear waste.

KEY INSIGHTS

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The WORLD NUCLEAR WASTE REPORT (WNWR) shows that governments around the world have been struggling for decades to develop and implement comprehensive nuclear waste management strategies. Much of the task will fall onto future generations.

WASTE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

More than 70 years after the start of the nuclear age, no country in the world has a deep geological repository for spent nuclear fuel in operation. Finland is the only country that is currently constructing a permanent repository for this most dangerous type of nuclear waste. Besides Finland, only Sweden and France have de facto deter- mined the location for a high-level waste repository in an early confinement process. The US is operating the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). However, this repository is only used for long-lived transuranic waste from nuclear weapons, not for spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors.

Despite multiple examples of failed selection procedures and abandoned repositories, current nation- al and international governance show a preference for geological disposal. This requires clear and am- bitious conditions for the site selection, exploration, and approval processes. Still, there is no guarantee for the feasibility of deep geological disposal. This is why the process of searching for such repositories must be implemented with extraordinary care on the basis of industrial feasibility and accompanied by appropriate monitoring. Some scientists consider that monitored, long-term storage in a protected environment is more responsible, much faster to achieve and should therefore be implemented. Overall there is a strong consensus that the current state of research and scientific debate and exchange with politicians and involved citizens is not adequate for the magnitude of the challenge.

The conditioning, transport, storage and disposal of nuclear waste constitute significant and growing challenges for all nuclear countries. These developments show that governments and authorities are under pressure to improve the management of interim storage and disposal programs. Accordingly, standards must be implemented for the governance of the programs, including planning quality and safety, quality assurance, citizen participation and safety culture.

Interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste will continue for a century or more. With deep geological repositories not available for decades to come, the risks are increasingly shifting to interim storage. The current storage practices for spent nuclear fuel and other easily dispersible inter- mediate- and high-level waste forms were not planned for the long-term. These practices thus represent a growing and particularly high risk, especially when other options are available (solidification, dry storage) in hardened facilities. Extended storage of nuclear waste increases risks today, adds billions in costs, and shifts these burdens to future generations.

QUANTITIES OF NUCLEAR WASTE

European countries have produced several million cubic meters of nuclear waste (not even including uranium mining and processing wastes). By the end of 2016, France, the United Kingdom and Germany were Europe’s biggest producers of nuclear waste along the nuclear fuel chain.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Over 60,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel are stored across Europe (excluding Russia and Slovakia), most of which in France. Within the EU, France accounts for 25 percent of the current spent nuclear fuel, followed by Germany (15 percent) and the United Kingdom (14 percent). Spent nuclear fuel is considered high-level waste. Though present in comparably small volumes, it makes up the vast bulk of radioactivity.

In the UK, for instance, high-level waste amounted to less than 3 percent of nuclear waste’s volume, but almost 97 percent of the inventory’s radioactivity. Most of spent fuel has been moved into cooling pools (so-called wet storage) to reduce heat and radioactivity. As of 2016, 81 percent of Europe’s spent nuclear fuel was in wet storage. It would be safer to transfer the spent nuclear fuel into dry storage in separate facilities. A large share of the stored spent nuclear fuel in France and the Netherlands is planned to be reprocessed. Most other European nuclear countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, and most recently the UK) have indefinitely suspended or terminated reprocessing. Not all countries report about the quantities of spent fuel that have been reprocessed. In most cases only vitrified high-level waste from reprocessing is reported. The same accounts for the vast amounts of reprocessed uranium, plutonium, intermediate-level waste, and spent mixed oxide fuel (MOX) that requires an extensive additional intermediate storage period.

Around 2.5 million m³ of low- and intermediate-level waste has been generated in Europe (excluding Slovakia and Russia). Around 20 percent of this waste (0.5 million m³) has been stored across Europe, waiting for final disposal. This amount is constantly increasing with no full disposal route anywhere.

Around 80 percent of this waste (close to 2 million m³) has been disposed of. However, this does not mean that the waste is successfully eliminated for the coming centuries. For instance, the Asse II disposal site in a former salt mine in Germany suffers from continuous inflow of groundwater. The 220,000 m³ of mixed disposed waste and salt need to be retrieved, which is a complex and costly task. The quantities are now five times the original amount of waste due to the mixture of salt and radioactive waste. There- fore, the term final disposal should be used with caution.

The decommissioning of nuclear facilities will create additional very large amounts of nuclear waste.

Exlcuding fuel chain facilities, Europe’s power reactor fleet alone may generate at least another 1.4 mil- lion m³ of of low- and intermediate level waste from decommissioning. This is a conservative estimate as decommissioning experiences are scarce. As of 2018, 142 nuclear power plants were in operation in Europe (excluding Russia and Slovakia).

The ongoing generation of nuclear waste and the upcoming decommissioning of nuclear facilities poses an increasing challenge, because storage facilities in Europe are slowly running out of capacity, especially for spent nuclear fuel. For example, storage capacity for spent fuel in Finland has reached already 93 percent saturation. Sweden’s decentralized storage facility CLAB is at 80 percent saturation.

However, not all countries report on saturation levels of storage capacities, making a complete overview impossible.

Over its lifetime, the European nuclear reactor fleet is estimated to produce around 6.6 million m³ of nuclear waste (excluding Russia and Slovakia). If stacked in one place, this would fill up a football field 919 meters high, 90 meters higher than the tallest building in the world, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai. The calculation includes waste from operation, spent nuclear fuel, and reactor decommissioning. This estimate and the ones above are based on conservative assumptions. The actual quantities of nuclear waste in Europe are likely higher. With a share of 30 percent, France would be Europe’s greatest producer of nuclear waste, followed by the UK (20 percent), the Ukraine (18 percent), and Germany (8 percent).

These four countries account for more than 75 percent of the European nuclear waste.

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Apart from Russia, which is still an active producer of uranium, Germany and France have the largest inventory of nuclear waste from uranium mining in Europe. Officially, the former French uranium min- ing industry generated 50 million tons of mining residues, but independent experts estimate that it is much higher. The former German Democratic Republic (GDR) mined much larger quantities of uranium ore than France. The mining legacies comprise some 32 km² of facility areas, 48 heaps with a volume of low active rocks of 311 million m³ and four tailing ponds holding a total of 160 million m³ of radioactive sludge. Today, the EU imports most uranium, creating large amounts of nuclear waste outside of Europe.

COSTS AND FINANCES

Nearly every government claims to apply the polluter-pays-principle, which makes operators liable for the costs of managing, storing, and disposing of nuclear waste. In real- ity, however, governments fail to apply the polluter-pays-principle consistently. Most countries enforce it only on decommissioning, although there are some cases where the government takes over the liability for decommissioning (for example, for the reactors in former East Germany). Bulgaria, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic receive EU support for decommissioning in exchange for having closed their older Soviet-era nuclear power plants. Most countries do not enforce the polluter-pays-principle for the disposal costs of nuclear waste. For this, national authorities more or less end up assuming liability as well as the responsibilities for long-term waste management and disposal. The operator is, however, required to contribute to financing the long-term costs. Even in countries in which the polluter-pays-principle is a legal requirement, it is applied incompletely. For instance, a nuclear power plant operator will not be held financially liable for any problems arising once a final disposal facility is closed; this is the case for the German Asse II disposal facility, where the retrieval of large amounts of waste has to be paid for by taxpayers.

Governments fail to properly estimate the costs for decommissioning, storage, and disposal of nu- clear waste. All cost estimates have underlying uncertainties due to long time-scales, cost increases, and estimated discounting (fund accumulation) rates. A major reason for the uncertainty is the lack of experience in decommissioning and waste disposal projects in particular. Only three countries, the US, Germany and Japan, have completed decommissioning projects including full dismantling and thus generated data. As of mid-2019, of 181 closed power reactors in the world, only 19 had been fully decommissioned, of which only 10 to “green field”. But even these limited experiences show a wide range of uncertainty, up to a factor of five. In the US, decommissioning costs varied between reactors from US$280/kW to US$1,500/kW. In Germany, one reactor was decommissioned for US$1,900/kW, another one for US$10,500/kW.

Many governments base their cost estimates on outdated data. Many countries reviewed here such as France, Germany, and the US base their estimates on studies from the 1970s and 1980s, rather than on the few existing real-data cases. Using outdated data, in most cases drawn up by operators, industry, or state agencies, likely leads to low-cost estimates and overly optimistic conclusions.

Many governments apply overly optimistic discount rates. One key factor leading to the underestima- tion of the costs for decommissioning and nuclear waste management is the systematic use of overly optimistic discount rates. A fundamental aspect of funding decommissioning and waste management is the expectation that the funds will grow over time. In Germany, for instance, the funds of €24 billion set aside for all waste management-related activities are expected to grow nearly fourfold to €86 billion by 2099. The discount rates employed range widely, and not all countries calculate cost increases, although it is likely that costs will increase faster than the general inflation rates.

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In order to guarantee the availability of sufficient funding for decommissioning, waste management and disposal, the financing schemes need to create secure holding conditions for the funds (“ring-fencing”).

They also need to make sure that the resources set aside are sufficient to cover the real costs. Some countries fulfill one condition but fail on the other.

Countries differ significantly on how they plan the financing of nuclear waste management, storage, and disposal. Not all nuclear countries require decommissioning funds to be managed externally and segregated from the operator or licensee. Decommissioning is in some cases still financed through in- ternal segregated and restricted funds, although the money for long-term waste management is managed externally in most countries. Financing decommissioning and storage is complex; in most cases, multiple funding systems are in place in one country.

In light of different national approaches, governments do not always define what “decommissioning”

includes. Nuclear waste management is an important aspect of decommissioning, as is spent fuel management. But both are not always defined under “decommissioning”, making it hard to compare costs across different countries. The processes of decommissioning, storage, and disposal are heavily in- terlinked. That is why an integrated external segregated and restricted fund seems to be the most suitable approach to finance the future costs for these processes. Only a few countries have opted for this solution, notably Sweden, the UK, and Switzerland; although, Switzerland has two funds, one for decommissioning and one for waste management. No country has secured the complete financing of decommissioning, storage, and disposal of its nuclear waste. Doing so will be a challenge for all coun- tries using nuclear power.

Today, no country has both estimated costs precisely and closed the gap between secured funds and cost estimates. In most cases, only a fraction of the funds needed has been set aside. For instance, Sweden has set aside funds for decommissioning and waste management of two thirds of the estimated costs so far, the United Kingdom less than half for its operational reactors, and Switzerland not even a third. The same can be observed of funding waste disposal. France and the US have set aside funds for disposal that would cover only around a third of the estimated costs. As an increasing number of reactors are closing ahead of schedule due to unfavorable economic conditions, the risk of insufficient funds is increasing. These early closures, shortfalls in funds, and rising costs are pushing some nuclear power plant operators to delay other closures and decommissioning in order to build up additional funds. Countries are also considering ways to enable facilities to recover their costs through higher fees, subsidized prices and lifetime extensions, for instance in the US and Japan.

ORIGINS AND CLASSIFICATIONS

Countries differ significantly in how they define nuclear waste. They differ in whether spent nuclear fuel and some of its separated products (plutonium and reprocessed uranium) are considered waste or a resource. For instance, spent fuel and the plutonium it contains qualify as waste in most countries because of the hazardous nature and the high costs of plutonium separation and use. However, France defines plutonium as a potential resource and requires reprocessing by law. Reprocessing both postpones the waste issue and makes it more complex and expensive.

Countries differ significantly in how they categorize nuclear waste. No two countries have identical systems. Germany differentiates only between heat-generating and other waste. The UK uses the level of radioactivity to classify its waste. France and the Czech Republic consider both, the level of radioactivity

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and the time period of radioactive decay (half-life). The US system differs fundamentally from that of European countries in that it bases classification on the origins of waste, not its characteristics.

Countries differ significantly in how they report about generated amounts of nuclear waste. All coun- tries publish regularly information on the amount of waste they produce and associated management schemes. Yet not all countries report in a thorough way. In some cases, the reported information cannot be used to estimate volumes (such as Slovakia). Some country reports (such as the Dutch and the Bel- gian) lack an up-to-date inventory of spent nuclear fuel. Russia gives little information on the classification and state of its nuclear waste inventory.

These differences and inconsistencies of how countries define, categorize and report about nuclear waste makes gathering data and comparing countries very complex. The different national approaches reflect a lack of coherency in how countries manage nuclear waste. They occur in the face of international attempts to establish common safety principles and creating a peer review process of country practices. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides a broad framework of classification for nuclear waste. The 2001 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management constitutes a default position for many countries, however, but with largely differing implementation practices. With the 2011 Euratom Directive, the EU attempted to har- monize waste classification systems for its member states, but with limited success.

RISKS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH

Nuclear waste constitutes a health hazard for several reasons. First are the reported health impacts from routine gaseous and liquid waste emissions from nuclear facilities.

Second are the very large global collective doses from reprocessing. And third is the unsat- isfactory and unstable condition of much of the nuclear waste already created. High-level waste (HLW) in the form of spent nuclear fuel and vitrified waste from reprocessing contains more than 90 percent of the radioactivity in nuclear waste. However, there is no fully operational HLW final disposal site in the world. The continued practise of storing spent nuclear fuel for long periods in pools at nuclear power plants (wet storage) constitutes a major risk to the public and to the environment.

Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in particular creates more accessible and dispersible forms of highly dangerous radioactive wastes, and poses increased challenges, including proliferation risks, high ex- posures to workers and the public, and radioactive contamination of the environment.

Information is limited to properly assess risks from nuclear waste and develop hazard rankings. Only a few countries publish information, for example, on nuclide inventories in wastes. National governments or state agencies are primarily responsible for collecting and disseminating such data. This data is needed to properly assess the potential causal relationship between exposures and health effects. So far, no comprehensive hazard scheme exists for the radionuclides in nuclear waste.

There is a lack of comprehensive, high quality studies to assess risks from nuclear waste. Risks may be derived from epidemiological studies, but the few specific ones that exist are of limited quality.

Some studies suggest increased cancer rates, for example, but are individually too small to give statistically significant results. Meta-analyses could combine smaller studies to generate larger datasets, which could produce statistically significant findings. However, meta-analyses on the health impacts of nuclear waste are notable for their virtual absence. In addition, in order to assess risks, it is also necessary to measure doses accurately. Overall, the analysis reveals an astonishing lack of quantitative and qualitative information on risks associated with nuclear waste.

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COORDINATOR NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AND OUTLOOK

The World Nuclear Waste Report (WNWR) provides an international comparison how countries manage nuclear waste, outlining their current status and historical trends. With its focus on Europe, it begins filling a significant research gap. Outside of Europe, there is even more variation of practices by operators and governments in dealing with the challenge of nuclear waste. Social, political, technical, and financial challenges on the way to finding a sound long-term solution for these particular problem wastes are high.

As this is the first of its kind, the report faced many hurdles in its aim to provide a meaningful overview based on a large amount of complete factual and numerical data. Not only do countries differ significantly how they define nuclear waste, how they classify its different types, and how they report about its generated amounts. The research also revealed a lack of data, faced language barriers, varying uses of terminology in countries, and inconsistencies in sources. All of this makes the assessment highly complex.

To overcome these hurdles and to avoid errors, the project team developed a specific quality management approach for contributors, editors, and proofreaders. Elements included a workshop in Brus- sels (February 2019), developing an author stylesheet (including terminology), developing a template for country chapters, and implementing a thorough review process with several feedback loops. Each chapter has been drafted by a single author with a specific expertise on the topic; some authors have drafted more than one chapter. However, the chapters are not attributed to individual authors to ensure a high-quality editorial process. Each chapter draft went through a four-stage review process:

• an initial editing by the lead editor and two more persons from the project team;

• a cross-chapter review by the lead editor;

• an overall review of the full text by the lead editor, by three other members of the project team, and by two external proofreaders;

• and a final review to develop the executive summary.

Producing the report has been a tremendous task of more than a dozen experts in this field over the course of one and a half years. It allowed for the text to improve significantly over time. The authors, editors, and proofreaders have done their utmost to verify and double-check. However, this intense process does not guarantee that the report is free of errors. In case there are, we are grateful for corrections and suggested improvements.

This first edition of the WNWR aims at laying the groundwork for future research on the topic. New questions have come up, and some should be addressed in the next edition of the report, such as the risks that the extended use of unsuitable interim storage poses and the foreseeable lack of capacities for interim storage, proliferation, the threat of terrorism and other security issues when assessing the risk of nuclear power, the practice of uranium mining, the clearance of fractions of the waste by free measurement, and the role of public participation in site selection processes. The next edition could also expand its geographical scope to other nuclear countries. Among them are Canada, China, Finland, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Spain, and Ukraine.

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No country in the world has a final disposal site for high-level nuclear waste in operation yet; Finland is the only country that is currently constructing a permanent repository for this most dangerous type of radioactive waste. Most countries have yet to develop and implement a functioning waste management strategy for all kinds of nuclear waste. For instance, after spending four decades on exploring one site, Germany has just started over with a completely new search process for finding a location to bury its most radioactive waste. The French government has unilaterally opted for a deep geological disposal in northeastern France, but since then public protests will not stop. In Sweden, courts rejected the technical concept of the operator and put the seemingly ready site and storage plan on hold.

After more than 70 years of using nuclear power for electricity

generation, large amounts of nuclear waste have accumulated world- wide. How much of it and what exact types remains unknown.

A first glance reveals that governments worldwide have not only been struggling to develop waste management strategies, but also differ widely on their approaches: how to determine a site for a final repository, how to classify nuclear waste, which safety standards to require from operators, and how to secure funding to cover the ever-growing costs.

With reactors across the world approaching the end of their lifetimes and many countries phasing out nuclear power—whether by active policy or “organically” through non-renewal—decommissioning and dismantling of nuclear facilities will become increasingly important issues entailing additional challenges in terms of nuclear waste management. The decommissioning of a single reactor takes almost 20 years on average, but in many cases even longer. It is clear that this process will produce additional large volumes of radioactive waste. In absence of final disposal sites, most of the spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste must be stored for several decades, challenging the safety and security requirements for intermediate storage facilities and causing much higher costs than previously estimated.

In short, there is a lack of understanding about where countries around the world stand in trying to address the complex challenges that nuclear waste management and disposal poses. This report tries to change that.

The WNWR aims to make a substantial contribution to understanding nuclear waste challenges for countries around the world. It does so by describing national and international classification systems, the risks posed by specific radioactive waste forms, generated and estimated future waste quantities, the waste management and disposal strategies of governments and their financing mechanisms.

CHAPTER 2 ORIGINS AND CLASSIFICATION describes the origins of nuclear waste across the nucle- ar fuel chain, from uranium mining through to operation, spent fuel management and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. It explains how different categories of waste vary in volume and activity, and presents international systems and national examples for classifying nuclear waste.

1 INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 3 QUANTITIES OF WASTE gives an overview about the reporting obligation that countries have under the key international framework which deals with nuclear waste, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (referred to as the Joint Convention throughout the report). It presents an estimate of waste quantities that are typically generated along the nuclear fuel chain. In addition, the chapter assesses the current waste inventories of European countries and provides an estimate of future quantities.

CHAPTER 4 RISK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN HEALTH presents which risks arise from the various steps along the nuclear fuel chain: uranium mining, milling, enrichment, and fuel fabrication, the operation of nuclear power plants; spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and decommissioning. The chapter focuses on higher activity wastes, assesses the state of research on these risks, and highlights potential dangers and problems.

CHAPTER 5 WASTE MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS reviews the approaches that governments have de- veloped over the past decades to manage nuclear waste. It looks at the variety of disposal paths that have been pursued, which differ in terms of host rocks, requirements for repositories of low- and intermediate-level and high-level waste, and the option of deep borehole disposal. The chapter describes the challenges of interim storage, which becomes increasing relevant due to the lack of operational final repositories.

CHAPTER 6 COSTS AND FINANCING presents the nature of the funding systems for decommission- ing, storage, and disposal. It compares methodologies to develop cost estimates and compares these to the practice in reviewed countries. The chapter gives an overview of national funding systems for decommissioning, storage, and disposal.

CHAPTER 7 COUNTRY STUDIES offers a selection of case studies, including the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Each sec- tion describes the national classification system, the quantities of waste involved, the waste management policies and facilities, and the approach on costs and financing.

Taking into account the project’s budget constraints and the complexity of the topic, the WNWR needed to set priorities of what it can cover and what not:

• First, the WNWR focuses geographically on Europe and here those countries that produce nuclear waste. Due to insufficient data, however, Russia and Slovakia could not be included sys- tematically. Following the overview chapters, the report presents eight specific country cases.

The countries were selected to represent a broad variety of characteristics, such as small (Czech Republic, Hungary, Switzerland) and large nuclear states (France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), old (France, Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom) and new EU member states (Czech Republic, Hungary) as well as a non-EU country (Switzerland), countries that phase out nuclear power (Germany, Sweden) and also those still building nuclear plants (France, United Kingdom).

The report also includes the case of the United States, the world’s largest nuclear country, which allows the comparison European strategies with those of another major player. There are some absentees in the European group, notably Finland (with the only geological repository under construction in the world), Spain (which is a substantial player) and Russia (a major operator with numerous facilities, reprocessing and legacy waste challenges). On a global level, Canada would be an interesting candidate to include (in particular due to its large-scale uranium mining), as well as some major producers in Asia (China, India, South Korea, and Japan).

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• Second, the WNWR focuses on waste from nuclear power for electricity generation. It does not cover radioactive waste from sectors like the military, medicine, research and industry. This focus has been set for several reasons: a) the quantities of waste generated by the commercial nuclear power industry, including those from decommissioning power reactors and other facilities of the nuclear fuel chain, represent the lion’s share of the radioactive inventories; b) this focus includes spent nuclear fuel waste, which is extremely relevant because the radioactivity levels contained here are much higher than anywhere else in nuclear activities; c) all countries struggle to develop long-term management routes for spent nuclear fuel. Problem of managing wastes from nuclear power production are therefore major political issues. Radioactive waste from medicine, industry and research are only touched upon briefly in this report, though they certainly would deserve more attention. Similarly, less attention is paid to legacy wastes and especially those arising from the military operations, such as the production of nuclear weapons.

Comparing countries with military wastes with those with only a civil cycle is highly complex.

All nuclear waste is radioactive, but the report uses the term (as opposed to ‘radioactive waste’) as it is focuses on waste deriving from civil nuclear power activities.

• Third, readers may notice the WNWR does not provide in-depth analysis of a variety of issues related to nuclear waste that deserve further scrutiny. This includes complex topics such as reprocessing and the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. It may also be worthwhile to look into the role nuclear waste has played in the history of major nuclear accidents such as Kyshtym, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl or Fukushima. The WNWR does not provide any analysis of the social and political issues concerning radioactive waste governance. While we fully acknowledge that nuclear waste management and disposal are not simply technical problems, but also raise profound social and political challenges, such issues are beyond the scope of this first edition of the report.

The approach of the WNWR is descriptive, empirical, technical and analytical. The intention is to assess the state of current affairs, to provide data as accurate as available, and to describe the approaches of a range of utility, industry and state operators to address the challenges of nuclear waste.

The report does not aim, however, to lead readers taking certain technical or political positions or to develop recommendations for best practice approaches. The examination of the conflicts and consequences inherent to nuclear policy and waste management choices is not the objective of the analysis. The underlying hypotheses of the report is that radioactive waste management and disposal constitute significant and growing challenges, and that sustainable long-term solutions are lacking. Despite many plans and declared political intentions, huge uncertainties remain, and much of the costs and challenges will fall onto future generations.

The WNWR should allow for comparison across countries and, as we aim for a periodical format, for monitoring over time. It identifies sources of uncertainty, such as inconsistencies, contradictions and data gaps. While every effort has been made to ensure consistency and accuracy, there are inevitable problems of categorization, definition, and information which make comparisons of costs, risks, inventory, and management approaches often difficult, sometimes even impossible.

This report is the first of its kind. With its focus on Europe, it aims to begin filling a significant research gap. Outside the EU and Europe, there is even more variation in waste classification and practices by operators and governments agencies on nuclear waste. Social, political, technical, and financial hurdles on the way to finding a sound long-term solution for these particular problem wastes are high.

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Nuclear waste is radioactive, but here the term ‘nuclear waste’ is used as opposed to ‘radioactive waste’

as the coverage of this report is focused on waste deriving from civil nuclear power. The term ‘nuclear waste’ is also used in the military nuclear sector for waste from the production of nuclear weapons or from naval propulsion systems. Similarly, the much smaller volumes of radioactive waste, generally representing lower hazards that originate from industrial, research and medical uses, are only touched upon in this report.

What exactly constitutes waste, as opposed to a useful substance or material, turns out not to be a matter of common sense. For example, the UK government’s guidelines on whether a substance is any kind of waste are complex. Waste may, in this categorization, be something that the producer or owner intends to discard; has low or negative economic value; or is hazardous. However, in any of these cases recycling or re-use may be possible, turning the relevant substance into a ‘non-waste’.¹

Applied in the nuclear sector, the major issue is whether or not some substances produced by nuclear reactions are to be considered waste or potential resources. One question is whether depleted uranium from the enrichment of uranium is or is not waste; and large volumes—hundreds of thousands of tons—

are involved. However, the main dispute surrounds the products that arise when spent fuel from nuclear reactors is ‘reprocessed’. Reprocessing is where spent fuel is separated into its component parts: plutonium, uranium and various fission products and actinides as well as other process waste streams. Most reprocessing, for example in France and the UK, is clearly intended to reuse the separated plutonium, and possibly the reprocessed uranium, as fuel in nuclear reactors. Significant quantities of plutonium have already been re-used in this way in various countries.

However, plutonium may qualify as waste by virtue of its indisputably hazardous nature and/or its low or negative economic value. Whether or not plutonium and reprocessed uranium are categorized as waste or a resource varies by country and over time. For example, in the UK in the 1950s, official economic appraisals of nuclear projects included a ‘plutonium credit’. It was intended to reflect the expected value of separated plutonium as a future nuclear fuel. Forty years later, this early optimism had faded. By the mid-1990s, plutonium was classified as a ‘zero-valued asset’ or of ‘zero book value’ in the two main producer countries, the UK and France, a category puzzling to economists. By the 2010s, the status of plutonium had become uncertain. The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) declared that its preferred option was to re-use plutonium as a component of future nuclear fuel.² It also argued that a small quantity of plutonium would have to be treated as waste because it was unsuitable for in- corporation into mixed oxide fuel. If re-use turned out to be unfeasible, the immobilization planned for the contaminated plutonium might be extended to the whole stockpile, at which point plutonium in general would unambiguously be waste. In any event, the total net cost of managing plutonium in the

1 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 2012, Guidance on the legal definition of waste and its application, viewed 11 June 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/

attachment_data/file/69590/pb13813-waste-legal-def-guide.pdf

2 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) 2014, Separated plutonium: progress on approaches to management, position paper, viewed 11 June 2019,

2 ORIGINS AND

CLASSIFICATIONS

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UK is expected to be at least £3 billion (US$3.8 billion).³ In France, the only remaining country separating plutonium in large quantities for commercial use, reprocessing remains required by law.

While plutonium in some cases may appear as a resource in the short term, it is currently almost ex- clusively re-used in fuel only once as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel; here plutonium re-use simply leads to another form of spent nuclear fuel. In addition, spent MOX fuel is more radioactive and difficult to manage than the spent fuel produced using uranium-only fuel. In other words, reprocessing both postpones the waste issue and makes it more complex.

Managing the various products of nuclear reactions, whether formally categorized as waste or not, is politically and socially contentious and involves potentially high hazards.

The point here is not to adjudicate on the status of plutonium or other materials. It is rather to recog- nize that the issue of managing the various products of nuclear reactions, whether formally categorized as waste or not, is politically and socially contentious and involves potentially high hazards. While this chapter covers the range of waste products resulting from nuclear reactions, the special importance of spent fuel is that it is 100 million times more radioactive than fresh fuel.⁴ It is therefore necessary to give particular attention to spent fuel waste.

2.1 TYPES OF WASTE: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHAIN

Nuclear waste arises (‘arisings’ is a term widely used in this context) at all stages of the nuclear fuel chain, often also referred to as the nuclear fuel cycle. While it is possible to use thorium as a primary nuclear fuel, in practice uranium is overwhelmingly the dominant source of fuel for nuclear power. All the waste described and classified here ultimately stems from the ways in which uranium is currently used in electricity production. There is thus no consideration of the types of waste that would arise if nuclear fusion were ever a serious power source.

The sequential stages of the nuclear fuel chain are as follows (see Figure 1):

1. Uranium mining, milling, enrichment and fuel fabrication.

2. Irradiation of nuclear fuel in power or research reactors (nuclear fission).

3. Management of spent fuel, whether or not reprocessed.

4. Reactor decommissioning

The activities in stage 1 are often referred to as the ‘front end’ of the fuel chain. Stages 3 and 4 are often known as the ‘back end’ of the fuel chain.

3 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) 2010, Plutonium: credible options analysis (redacted), viewed 11 June 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/

457827/Plutonium_-_credible_options_analysis_2010__redacted_.pdf

4 Open University 2011, ‘Inside Nuclear Energy Science’. Short Module, ST174, Milton Keynes.

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FIGURE 1 | The nuclear fuel chain

~VLLW ~LLW

~ILW

~LLW HLW

LLWILW LLWVLLW

HLW HLW

HLW

ILW ILW Storage DisposalRepro- cessingReactor UseFuel FabricationConversion EnrichmentMining Milling

Uranium Ore

RE-RepU UO2

RE-RepU Fuel

Spent RE-RepU

Fuel Opera-

tional Waste

Decom- missioning

Waste

MOXFuel

ScrapMOX Spent

MOX Depleted

Uranium Separated UO2 Plutonium PuO2

Separated Plutonium PuO2 Uranium

Tailings Vitriﬁed

Waste

Structure Waste

Process Waste Natural

Uranium UF₆

Enriched Uranium UO₂

Repro- cessed Uranium U Nitrate

Repro- cessed Uranium

UF6

Repro- cessed Uranium

U3O8 Depleted RE-RepU U3O8 Uranium

UOX Fuel

Spent Uranium

Fuel

Spent Uranium

Fuel

Depleted Uranium U3O8

Source: WISE-Paris.

The waste that arises at these various stages can be gaseous, liquid or solid. For some forms of gaseous waste, for instance radon in underground uranium mines, measurements are rarely attempted, and management consists in reducing exposures rather than measuring or capturing existing levels, even though gases like radon are extremely harmful. In some cases, radioactivity is filtered out of exhaust gases and injected with liquid effluents into the sea, which is another form of reducing immediate exposure, without reducing toxicity at the source. Solid forms of waste are generally the most stable and easiest to manage, and a substantial aim in policy is therefore commonly to convert less stable waste forms into more manageable solid forms. For example, reprocessing of spent fuel produces a waste stream of boiling and radioactive nitric acid, which is then subject to evaporation and turned into a vitrified (glass) product.

Along the four stages of the nuclear fuel chain, a variety of waste types occur:

URANIUM MINING, MILLING, PROCESSING AND FUEL FABRICATION

An important waste and major health risk is radon gas in underground uranium mines. Radon gas is an alpha emitter and decays to solid polonium, which has similar characteristics. Another source of radioactivity from uranium mining of any kind is the persistent presence of uranium, which decays into radon, in mine tailings: waste heaps of discarded rock material from mining operations. These tailings take up very large volumes and can cause significant health problems, especially in developing countries, where management practices are sometimes poor. Because radon is released as a gas, it is not possible to directly capture it. The other stages of uranium processing (conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication) produce very limited amounts of waste.

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NUCLEAR FISSION (FUEL IRRADIATION)

In the process of fission, significant quantities of waste are generated as ‘operational waste’, broadly from maintenance, refueling and transport of spent fuel. Operational waste includes: debris from fuel elements, including steel and various alloys; core or heat exchanger components from maintenance, re- pairs or refurbishment, which are often highly active; contaminated liquid waste and sludge; resins and filters; and clothing and equipment, generally at low levels of activity.

MANAGEMENT OF SPENT FUEL

Nuclear fission in reactors is the area of nuclear technology that produces by far the largest amount of radioactivity. Irradiation produces a variety of fission products and actinides that multiply the radioactivity in the original uranium fuel by more than 100 million times. Management of spent fuel, whether via reprocessing or regarding it as a waste for possible direct disposal, is therefore by far the most important waste management activity arising from the nuclear fuel chain. Initially, spent fuel has to be stored under water for several years in a cooling pool in the reactor building or in an adjacent building to allow the decay heat to decrease. Water also provides some shielding against radiation.

The spent fuel can later also be transported to a central wet or dry storage facility. The main central wet storage centers are the reprocessing facilities such as Sellafield (UK), La Hague (France) and Ozersk (Russia). In the past twenty years intermediate-storage of spent fuel in dry casks has become more common mainly at nuclear power sites.

If fuel is reprocessed, then very large quantities of further low- and intermediate-level waste is created, meaning that the total volume of waste to be managed (though not the total activity) is much greater than if the spent fuel is treated directly as a waste. The residual fission products and actinides in liquid form (after uranium and plutonium are separated) are then evaporated and converted to solids by a vitrification process prior to intended further disposition. In addition, decommissioning reprocessing plants will be costly. Where spent fuel is treated directly as waste, it is encapsulated prior to disposal.

REACTOR (AND FUEL CHAIN FACILITY) DECOMMISSIONING

To date, very few reactors or other nuclear structures have been fully decommissioned (such as complete demolition), even where reactors have been closed for decades.⁵ One reason for the delay, other than the obvious one of postponed costs, is that some radionuclides contained in these structures have relatively short half-lives, so access for demolition is easier later. However, delays could make the phys- ical operations of dismantling more difficult, and relevant skills and oversight capacity may be lost. Re- actor structures contain significant quantities of radioactivity in their cores, as many components are contaminated by radioactivity from the fuel that has been irradiated within them. Large quantities of materials like steel and concrete from decommissioning therefore constitute radioactive waste, though their total activity levels are small compared to the activity in the spent fuel.

5 Schneider, M., Froggatt, A., Hazemann, J., Katsuta, T., Stirling, A., Wealer, B., Johnstone, P., Ramana, M.V. and Stienne, A. 2018. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2018, Mycle Schneider Consulting.

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2.2 WASTE QUANTITIES AND ACTIVITY

The total quantities and activity levels of these various categories of waste are inversely related. In other words, the lower-level waste is produced in large volumes but contributes very little to the overall inventory of radioactivity. Conversely, high-level waste (HLW) is present in very small volumes but makes up the vast bulk of radioactivity. This result is not surprising, given that the radioactivity in spent fuel from which HLW is derived is more than 100 million times greater than the radioactivity in fresh uranium fuel.⁶

Lower-level waste is produced in large volumes but contributes very little to the overall inventory of radioactivity. Conversely, high-level waste is present in very small volumes but makes up the vast bulk of radioactivity.

An illustration of this comes from the waste inventory that the UK Committee on Radioactive Waste Management considered when it examined UK nuclear waste policy in the early 2000s.⁷ High-level waste (here including spent fuel, plus HLW separated in reprocessing) amounted to 96.8 percent of the inventory’s radioactivity, but only 2.6 percent of its volume. ILW, with much larger volumes, contained only 3.2 percent of the total radioactivity, while the LLW contribution to total activity level was less than 0.001 percent).

2.3 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS AND CATEGORIES

Classification systems for nuclear waste can differentiate waste in terms of three characteristics:

• By level of radioactivity: low, intermediate and high

• By time period of radioactive decay: short-lived and long-lived

• By management option: type of storage/disposal facility.

The first two of these characteristics concern the inherent properties of the waste itself, while the third starts from decisions about management. In practice, all systems of classification refer to elements of level of radioactivity and management, while some ignore the decay periods.

Despite attempts over the years to agree within the EU on a consistent classification system for nuclear waste⁸, there remain quite different classification systems across the EU, some of which are summa- rized below. However, with its General Safety Guide on the Classification of Radioactive Waste, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides a broad framework of classification.⁹ It constitutes a default position; countries without nuclear power programs almost universally adopt it directly. For countries with significant nuclear programs, their national classifications of waste often refer back to the IAEA system for comparative purposes.

6 Open University, 2011.

7 Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) 2006, Managing our Radioactive Waste Safely:

CoRWM’s Recommendations to Government doc 700, July, pp. 20.

8 LLW Repository Ltd. 2016. “International Approaches to Radioactive Waste Classification.” NSWP-REP-134, October.

9 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 2009, Classification of Radioactive Waste: General Safety Guide GSG-1, viewed 11 June 2019, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1419_web.pdf

Deep geological disposal is one of the most ambitious and most difficult tasks on earth.

NUCLEAR WASTE REPORT 2019

Focus Europe.

Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz

Deep geological disposal is one of the most ambitious and most difficult tasks on earth.

FOREWORD

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CONTENTS

KEY INSIGHTS

KEY INSIGHTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

After more than 70 years of using nuclear power for electricity

generation, large amounts of nuclear waste have accumulated world- wide. How much of it and what exact types remains unknown.

1 INTRODUCTION

2 ORIGINS AND

CLASSIFICATIONS

Managing the various products of nuclear reactions, whether formally categorized as waste or not, is politically and socially contentious and involves potentially high hazards.

2.1 TYPES OF WASTE: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHAIN

2.2 WASTE QUANTITIES AND ACTIVITY

Lower-level waste is produced in large volumes but contributes very little to the overall inventory of radioactivity. Conversely, high-level waste is present in very small volumes but makes up the vast bulk of radioactivity.

2.3 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS AND CATEGORIES