ARAB SRING AND THE GOVERNANCE IN YEMEN
Mohammad Gulrez
Aligarh Muslim University
The young Arab republic has spent eight months trying to replace its president of 33 years.The state apparatus
dominated & maintained of competing tribes could only determine whether students and civil society demonstrators will yield a multi-party federation in Yemen. If the new
constitution is not drafted by the middle of 2015, approved by a
referendum and followed up by presidential and parliamentary elections , the country may very easily descend into widespread conflict. Unless some kind of decentralized federalism materializes , with strong political provincial representation at the local level , public distrust in Sanaa
political elite will continue. As a nation state ,Yemen is in perpetual crises, seemingly on the brink of chaos.
The present paper tries to :
1.Examine the formulation of nationalist discourse in response to crises.
2.Locates the issue of Identification and belonging in social, economic and Political Circumstances
Political fragmentation has been the dominant theme of Yemeni history due to tribal and confessional differences that exist ever since ,the North Yemen , or the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) , and South Republic , or the Peoplles Democratic Republic ( PDRY), united in a single state in 1990 which replaced imamate ( 1962) and PDRY , following independence from great Britain in 1967. This was reflected in the first parliamentary elections of 1993 which demonstrated the lack of demographic integration at the grassroots level as an extension of the two distinct power centers at the top, emanating essentially from tribal rather than ideological dedication.
The convergence of established norms and customs, especially the asabiyyah (the allegiance to one’s tribe or closest group based on tribe, region, etc., and which is well entrenched in the Yemeni society) further weakened the integrationist tendency.
Even after twenty four years ,beneath a single political entity, the Republic of Yemen, lay two distinct states with separate independent militaries in a state of mobilization. This state of affairs had a negative effect on the demographic integration which remained weak and anything but normal.
There have been sporadic violent clashes throughout much of the last decade between government forces and Shiite rebels known as Houthis in the north along Yemen’s border with Saudi Arabia. To the north and west , it has a long porous border with Saudi Arabia, which is very concerned that instability in Yemen – and the growing al Qaeda presence there – could spill over.Saudi Arabia has begun a multi-billion –dollar project to make its 1,100- mile border with Yemen more secure, including fences and barbed wire in areas most vulnerable. Since 9/11 the Saudis have invested heavily in stamping out the threat at home from al-Qaeda,and the last thing they want is contagion seeping in from next door. The same applies toOman, yemen’s other neighbor in the South.Saudi Arabia has also been concerned by what it sees asIranian meddling in Yemen in support of the rebellion by the Houthis (a Shia minority in the north). The Houthis have participated in the protests against the Saleh regime that began in January, but have not been leading faction or the driving force behind the most recent violence.
In the south , a renewed separatist movement that has been largely peaceful yet still marked by some violent incidents threatens the stability of a unified yemen.and the terrorists group of al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, or AQAP, has established a base of operations in Yemen’s vast ungoverned spaces and has launched attacks on the Yemeni and Saudi government,
Beyond these hard security challenges, the Yemeni economy is collapsing and the country faces severe water shortages with an exploding population that is already lacking adequate food supplies. Oil revenue accounts for nearly three- quarters of all government revenue but it’s all revenue are running out . The World Bank predicts output will fall to zero by 2017. The loss of oil revenue will be catastrophic in a country that already has more than 40 % of its population living on less than 2 $ a day. Unrest, a lack of foreign investment and sabotage of pipelines have all contributed to a dire outlook for Yemen’s oil industry , which is essential for the government’s revenues.The devaluation of riyal has led to an increase in food prices. The cost of a Gas cylinder rose from YR,050 to YR 300 in some instances.
Yemen's elected Parliament has been largely defunct. This is in large part due to:
(1) GPC political domination-the party controls almost 80% of the seats and most leadership positions;
(2) the socio-political profile of a majority of MPs- many with low, or very low, levels of education and even functional illiteracy, and many with military and security backgrounds; and
(3)various constitutional and legal constraints on parliamentary roles and responsibilities.
Because of the GPC's internal diversity many MPs have their own individual, tribal and regional interests and agendas, Yemen's Parliament possesses a certain political fluidity and occasionally a dynamism which MPs can exploit.
Ali Abdullah who was in power since 1990, is still viewed by many as a key stone holding together a country where the cleavages readily lend themselves to division and disorder and where tribalism influences and limits Yemeni politics. He is credited by some for having preserved the country’s unity in the secessionist war against his former southern partners in 1994, and against more recent tribal and sectarian forces in the north and south.
There is no naïveté, however. Like in the rest of the Arab World, there are complaints about corruption, nepotism, state violence , and favoritism in the slicing of economic pie. These ills, in fact have contributed to the rise of rebellious and divisive forces.
It is in this context the Yemeni regime of Abdullah Ali Saleh , according to Sarah Philips, can be classified as “neo-patrimonial”. In a patrimonial system, the right to rule is attributed to a person rather than an office. Formal state institutions and civil society organizations are transformed by the ruler into instruments to expand the patron-client network.
In such a context, the nation is “a contingent category rather than a “substantial thing”.
Consequently, identification is a contingent process in flux, constructed through per- formative practices and is influenced by their transformation, rather than being a historical given. In the case of Yemen, this becomes more intensified as categories of identification multiply: Tribal, sectarian (Zaidi-Shafii),
geographical (north-south), and even politico- ideological.
Among the Saleh unifying credentials is his acumen and support of family and tribe . His son Col Ahmed’s meteoric rise to the apex of the military command endows him with the means to defend his claim of his fathers mantle of leadership, should he could vie for it in future. In 2002, president . Saleh put Ahmed in- charge of the Republican Guard. The fact is that Colonel Ahmed is Commander of the country’s two deadliest fighting machine, the Republican Guards and the Special Forces, is more than an honorific assignment. By combining the command of both forces , Ahmed is given muscle to defend presidency, tribe and country.
The most sensitive military posts are held by Hashed tribesmen with direct blood ties to the president. The presidency has more or less been tribalized: this is at the core of Yemen’s duel succession.
Colonel Ahmed was assumed to be the first heir apparent; the Hashed tribesmen related to the president would be second in line for inheriting the presidency if unforeseen factors rule out
colonel Ahmed. Of these men , three are half brothers: Brigadier –General Muhammad al
Saleh al Ahmer, Commander of the Yemeni Air Force ; Brigadier- General Ali Mohsin al Ahmer, Commander of the Northern Region, and
Brigadier –General Ali al Saleh al Ahmer, Chief of Staff of the General Command , and four others are nephews. Many others are direct or indirect in laws of the president.
President Ali Abdullah Saleh
Ali Mohsin Al Ahmar Commander of Northern Region
Ahmad Ali Abdullah Saleh
Incharge of Republican Guard & Special
Forces
Mohammed Saleh Al Ahmar Commander of Yemeni Air Force
Hamid Al Ahmar
Son of Sheikh Abdullah Al Ahmar
Opposition Leader
Abdullah Al Ahmar
Former Chief of Hashid tribe
One thing must be gleaned from the foregoing.
President Saleh used to share the economic and political pie but not the military command , which is the exclusive bastion of the inner circle of Hashed tribe. This is the key insurance policy:
the presidency stays within Hashed. It is not up for grabs.
The sons and the relatives of late Sheikh Abdullah al Ahmer (paramount chief of the Hashed tribal confederacy that president al Saleh’s clan, the Sanhan , belongs to ) are political and economic beneficiaries.
This delicate division of resources and power has not passed however, to the next generation.
To consolidate its power base further the regime in Sana’a assigns a big role for tribal politics. It is evident that the government encourages this trend and even provides patronage to tribal groups by maintaining the Department of Tribal Affairs, an auxiliary to the Ministry of Domestic Administration.
(Suffice it to say that the budget of this department annually exceeds the budget of the Ministry of Higher Education as a whole). Many of these benefits were directed to the Hashed and Bakil confederations of tribes from the north, where the president is from.
The tribes in Yemen hold far greater importance vis-à-vis the state than elsewhere and continue to challenge the state on various levels.
His second son , Hamid , has high positions in partliament and in the Islah party ,proving himself in the 2006 elections to be a formidable match to any politicians in the country and a worthy replacement of his father. Dividing the pie among the hashid tribes and their allies is one of the factors that allowed Hamid to own a majority stake in one of yemen’s largest mobile phone companies , Sabafone, and make a fortune from it as well as from Islamic banking.
Council of deputies ( parliament) epitomizes this practice with many outgoing MPs passing on their seats to their sons or using their status or posts , including in the armed forces , to facilitate entry into parliament. As a result the Yemeni parliament is dubbed as Majls al Abna ( council of sons)
The logic of zero-sum-games is certainly not the most fruitful perspective at hand . The GCC borkered agreement was signed in November 2011. The deal granted former President Salih immunity in exchange for his resignation and set down an ambitious 2-phase roadmap.
In the first 90-day phase, Salih transferred presidential authority to Vice- President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who appointed a national unity cabinet and established a military committee to restore public security.
In February 2012, a popular referendum confirmed Hadi as president for a two-year term. Even though Saleh formally stepped down as President and elections took place in February 2012 (Hadi – was the only candidate) the political transition in Yemen in no way constituted regime change. The deal between the US, EU, GCC and Saleh merely gave Saleh a dignified exit. In fact, Salem himself is still the head of the ruling Gen eral People’s Con gress party (GPC) .
In the second phase of the roadmap, Hadi oversaw the restructuring of the armed forces and the NDC.
Pres i dent Hadi is still a long way from mean ing fully con sol i dat ing power. Withoutaclear,centralizedpowerbaseinSanaa,neitherPresi
dentHadinoranyoneelsehasbeenabletomeaningfullyaddresssecu
rityproblemsalloverthecountry.
Eight months behind schedule, the envisaged constitutional and electoral reforms, as well as the parliamentary and presidential
elections originally scheduled for February 2014(nowpostponed
to2015),followedbyanewconstitution.
Major debates occurred over the application of federalism and the degree of autonomy that federated regions would presumably
receive. creating a new political system, especially a federation that acknowledged rough parity among states or regions, was superbly complicated. But Yemen is on schedule, as dialogue participants agreed that its federal system would be composed of either two or six regions. Moreover, Sanaa required this southern backing
because it also faced uprisings by radical groups outside the political process, notably al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP and, to a lesser extent, by Houthi rebels.
Despite all of this, Yemen’s nation-building road ahead need not be dire, provided the international community is willing to roll up its sleeves and get to work on the ground and with the people. For now, the federal option promises to be the best available option as Yemenis gain the
political maturity to think as a unified nation instead of desperate tribes manipulated by outside forces.
Unless there are honest efforts , there are
speculations that the true power of the Yemeni State in Saleh’s absence will remain with the
leadership of the security services.
